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DCI BRIEFING

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

- I. The ideological differences between the USSR and Communist China that have come to the surface during the past two years constitute a permanent potential for rivalry between the two Communist great powers.
 - A. Three-week meeting of world Communist leaders in Moscow in November 1960 saw vehement debate of issues and vituperative exchanges between two sides.
 - 1. Unity maintained by hiding disagreements behind tortuous language of final communiqué and by compromises on both sides.
 - 2. Soviet party managed maintain primacy of its "general line" in foreign policy, but Chinese party achieved notable success on question of authority within movement. Long-term result likely to be increased "polycentrism" in movement with Soviet positions open to future negotiation and variation.
 - B. Ideological disagreements remain despite the compromises.
 - 1. This revealed in divergent propaganda treatment of the West and of the issues in dispute during 1960. Each side chooses own points for emphasis when discussing new manifesto and world events.

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- II. With public expression of doctrinal differences muted by decisions reached in November 1960, Sino-Soviet relations now marked by open political and economic rivalry.
 - A. Political rivalry shown in continued attempts by both parties to influence other Communist parties—notable recently in Soviet Presidium member Suslov's attendance and role at the Indian Communist Party Congress.
 - B. Economic rivalry demonstrated in stepped up aid by China to Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania, despite China's desperate economic difficulties.
- III. Offshoot of Sino-Soviet dispute is defiance of USSR by Albania.
 - A. Albania, smallest and weakest of European satellites, has openly opposed USSR since last June and criticized Khrushchev on a number of key policies; is now firmly backed by Communist China.
 - 1. Current trial of anti-state elements in Albania being used by regime to show that USSR has been following wrong policies in bloc since death of Stalin.
 - B. Seems likely that dissident elements in Eastern European regimes will regard Chinese Communist loan of \$125,000,000 to Albania--over 50 percent of the foreign aid it needs for third five year plan--as tangible evidence of Peiping's status and willingness to back heretical forces.
- IV. Sino-Soviet economic and trade talks, begun early this year, also reflect the serious difficulties between the two countries.

- A. Soviet recent offer of short-term aid niggardly in face of Chinese economic straits.
- B. No indication that Soviet technicians returning to China despite Chinese need for them.
- C. Chinese loan to Albania strongly suggests that Chinese no longer expect to receive much longer-term aid from USSR at this time, though aid talks still continuing.
- V. But important to remember that given manifestly overriding importance of their common interests, potential rivalry only becomes actual when concrete policy disagreements arise over specific issues where two countries' individual interests diverge sharply.
 - A. Good example of coordination of policy today is in Laos.
 - 1. Some differences of propaganda technique and tone noticeable.
 - 2. For most part, however, aims of two countries similar and since Soviet Union forcefully leading bloc in pursuit of these aims with notable success, potential for rivalry here not yet realized.

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